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In this short study of the nature-nurture debate, Evelyn Fox Keller explores the persistent 
argument about the degree to which phenotypic characteristics of organisms are due to 
genetic causes and to environmental causes. Although questions about organisms’ in-
born features and how those features may (or may not) change over time go back at least 
to Aristotle’s proposed teleological view of the epigenesis of organisms, Keller—given 
her interest in the language of the debate—naturally looks to the earliest use of the 
specific terminology (Nature versus Nurture) and the specific sense of ‘separability and 
oppositionality’ (19); she identifies Francis Galton as the first to create the ‘explicit 
conjunction’ (17) of the terms. It was Galton who first began the quest to assign a 
quantitative value to the weight of nature and of nurture in the development of traits; it 
was Galton who created the ‘mirage of a space between nature and nurture’. 
  
And indeed, it is a mirage. Keller analogizes Galton’s view of the origin of traits 
to the filling of a bucket: If two people are to fill a bucket with water, one may bring 40 
percent of the water, the other 60 percent. We can assign to each a specific quantitative 
contribution to the filling of the bucket. But, Keller points out, the development of traits 
is more accurately modeled by a different way of filling the bucket: If one person turns 
on the faucet, and the other holds the hose over the bucket, then it is impossible to assign 
quantitative value to the relative contributions of the two bucket-fillers. Or, in another of 
Keller’s persistent analogies, if we hear the sound of a drum, we cannot assign a certain 
percentage of the cause of the sound to the drummer, and another percentage to the drum. 
Likewise, each organism has the form that it does because its particular developmental 
path took place in a particular environment. Change the nurture or change the nature and 
the final form would change qualitatively. 
 
Virtually any recent scholar who has seriously thought about these issues 
acknowledges this fact: nature and nurture cannot be separated. However, the notion of 
nature and nurture as separable and opposing concepts persists in the popular 
imagination. And, Keller contends (rightly, I believe), even among scholars who are 
aware that this is an erroneous way to think about development there is a tendency for 
slippage into talking about nature and nurture as separable ends of a dichotomy. The 
reasons for this continuing confusion, according to Keller, are that the meanings of the 
concepts involved have changed over time, and are even now polysemous. 
 
In the beginning—that is, before Galton and Darwin—philosophers could write of 
natural traits being acquired through experience. J. S. Mill in particular wrote of traits 
such as human speech being natural, but acquired. For Mill, the dividing line for innate 
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and acquired traits was birth. After Galton and those who followed his ideas, the division 
shifted to internal versus external (and, along the way, to immutable versus changeable). 
 
Part of this shift involved the introduction of the term ‘heredity’ into English 
(which Keller attributes to Darwin and Herbert Spencer). This term moved our 
inheritance into our bodies and it created ‘a new ontological commitment to the material 
concreteness of whatever it was that lay behind hereditary processes’ (21). In other 
words, those aspects of our traits that we got from our ancestors were now seen as 
internally generated by what would eventually be called ‘genes’. This move led 
hereditary traits to become aligned with the concept of something being ‘inborn’ or 
‘innate’, in contrast to being ‘acquired.’ This ‘displace[s] Mill’s differentiation between 
innate and acquired—understood as a distinction marked by an event in time (birth)—by 
a distinction that cuts along a different axis, a division between internal and external’ 
(22). 
 
In another important shift, scholars moved away from viewing the nature-nurture 
debate as being about how much nature and nurture each contribute to the development 
of a trait. Now we were looking to determine how much variability in a trait (within a 
specific population) is associated with variability in nature and how much is associated 
with variability in nurture. This subtle transition—marked by use of the term 
‘heritability,’ which is an estimate of the phenotypic variability associated with genetic 
variability—truly changes the question that empirical researchers are answering. 
 
Moreover, it is a seemingly answerable question. In fact, it forms the basis of 
quantitative genetics. However, the answers arrived at have several important limitations 
(concerning, e.g., limits of specific populations, difficulties in dealing with gene-
environment interaction), which make them unsuited to address the previous question 
about the relative weight of genes and environment as causal forces in the development 
of traits. 
 
However, it is this latter question which seems to really be of interest to most 
people. Because of this, conclusions about the heritability of a trait (i.e., how much 
variability in a trait seems to be associated with variability in genetic makeup) frequently 
slip into conclusions about how much a trait is caused by one’s genes (and, by extension, 
how much the trait is innate and immutable). ‘I suggest more generally that much of our 
interest in heritability—as well as many of the arguments put forth on behalf of the 
importance of measuring such a quantity—rests deeply and inextricably on the unspoken 
ambiguity of the terms, and on the slippage that ambiguity invites’ (71). 
 
There is no doubt that the intensity of interest in these kinds of questions—both 
among scholars and among the general public—rests largely on the slippage to a question 
of how much genes contribute to the development of a trait. But interest in this latter 
question stems from specific real-world concerns. This is not just knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake. Few people on the street would be interested in the question of 
whether homosexuality is more likely to be shared by identical twins than by fraternal 
twins, unless they thought that it said something about the moral status of homosexuality. 
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Few would be interested in the heritability of diseases, unless they thought it could tell us 
something about the route to take to search for treatment or cure. And few would be 
interested in partialling out the variability in intelligence between genes and environment, 
unless it informed debates about political and social action. 
 
Unfortunately, Keller gives little attention to these important motivating factors 
behind the linguistic slippage that she identifies. She also fails to address at all the 
psychological factors that keep the nature-nurture debate from fading away (as she would 
prefer, 73). Anyone who has ever tried to explain statistical interactions to students 
knows that human minds seem poorly suited to this kind of understanding. It seems 
inevitable that most people will seek to simplify the complex interactions that underlie 
the development of biological and psychological traits. The mind seems drawn to 
dichotomies, and as such, nature-nurture seems destined to persist. 
 
Keller certainly had room to expand on these themes. It is not clear that the 
information included here—as useful as it is—needed a book-length treatment. Editing of 
some of the more repetitious parts of the text could have yielded a longish journal article, 
rather than this short book (107 pages, including the notes, references, and index). 
 
Keller ends her book with compelling arguments to reframe discussions of the 
origins of traits to discuss phenotypic plasticity and to incorporate modern 
understandings of molecular genetics and developmental biology. She reminds us that the 
moment of birth is an arbitrary dividing point between a period when traits can be 
changed or not, between traits that are somehow natural and traits that are somehow a 
product of nurture. And of course, she’s right; but without addressing the fundamental 
psychological, political, and moral needs and abilities that undergird the nature-nurture 
debate, I fear little change will come from adopting her solutions. 
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